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CHAPTER EIGHT

REALITY IN HEISENBERG'S PHILOSOPHY

SECTION I: THE EARLY HEISENBERG

General Outline
Heisenberg's discovery of quantum mechanics was accompanied, as we
have seen, by a great insight which was of the nature of a profound
metaphysical conversion; it was the discovery of a new meaning
for reality which was different from that of Newton, Gauss, Maxwell,
Hertz and the grand tradition of classical physics. The sudden swing
to the crude empiricism which characterised the early days of comple
mentarity did not last in Heisenberg's case, but changed slowly under
the subtle polarising influence of a strong rationalist tendency which
was in keeping with his temperament and choice and was encouraged
by his mathematical powers. Just as Einstein bega.p his philosophic
career under the influence of Hume and Mach to end fifty years later
in spiritual companionship with Leibniz and Spinoza, so Heisenberg
began as a disciple of Hume and ended in the company of Kant.
The transition was not sudden like his first conversion, nor was he
conscious of the growing complexity of his thought. If he had been,
he would have taken greater pains in his later writings to distinguish
his early views from· his later. The only indication of the meta
morphosis that occurred between 1925 and 1955 is in the change in
usage of such words as "objectivity", "causality", "reality", etc.,
which a careful examination of the context reveals. We have described
this metamorphosis elsewhere as the conquering of Hume by Kant;
we might also summarise his philosophical development as the result
of a dialectic between the Plato of his temperament and choice, and
the empiricism forced upon him by the discovery of quantum me
chanics and by the environment of Copenhagen.
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Heisenberg' s Empiricism
In his early papers and lectures on quantum mechanics, Heisenberg
insisted that physical quantities were real only when they were
actually observed, i.e., when they were instances describable in Eu
clidean space at a definite time and given in perception 1. Whatever
Hlacked intuitive foundation" 2, whatever had no "observational
consequences" 3, whatever is ((not experimentally verified" 4 is simply
excluded from the realm of physical reality.
The new emphasis on human sensibility might, however, be con
strued in two different ways: either as constitutive of a new meaning
(sense or connotation) for the term reality or as contributing merely
to a new criterion of the real in human knowing without connoting a
corresponding change in sense 5. The distinction is an important one
from the point of view of philosophy; for the basic metaphysical
orientation of a philosopher's mind is specified by the sense he assigns
to the term ((reality". In everyday life, we do not generally distinguish
between meaning (or intrinsic connotation) and criteria (which,
generally, are extrinsic associations); for it is ordinarily sufficient that
in daily life our words are correctly applied and correctly understood,
and for this purpose the present distinction is not required. It is a
distinction however which, even if acknowledged, is rarely given the
epistemological importance it merits. Nagel, for example, and other
philosophers of science of a positivistic bias seem to think it is just a
question of ttterminologicalinterest" and "preferred modes of speech"6.
Its importance is in the classification of ontological views, for it is only
with the help of this distinction that a particular opinion can be
situated with accuracy within the traditional extremes of rationalism
and empiricism.
As Heisenberg was not consciously aware of this distinction his
attitude has to be judged by inference from his statements. In his
early writings, the real object of physics tended to be identified with
observed events described in everyday or classical physical concepts.
1 "Modern physics is concerned not with the essence and structure of the atom but with
observable events and thus places emphasis on the measurement process" wrote Heisenberg
in "Kausalgesetz und Quantum Mechanik", Erkenntnis, II (1931), pp. 182-183. He goes on
to say that it is not the Beobachtungsobjekt allein with which physics deals but the Beobach
tungsvorgange. Cf. also Niels Bohr etc., p. 22.
2 Heisenberg, Zeit. /. Physik, XXXIII (1925), 879; XLIII (1927), 172.
3 Heisenberg, Physical Principles etc., p. IS.
4 Ibid., p. I.
f) Supra, chap. I, sect. I; chap. v, sect. I, e.g., p. 85.
6 E. Nagel's Structure 0/ Science (London: 1961), chap. VI.
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Since in the realm of quantum mechanics these do not obey causal
laws, the real objects of physics ~annot be conceptually or rationally
expressed at least not if the quantum system is conceived to move
continuously like a body. Conceptual schemes like the concept Hatom",
he wrote, merely make possible a simple formulation of the laws
governing all physical and chemical processes 1. All this implied a
rejection of the classical rationalist thesis. Moreover, in his description
of the subject-object relation in which the criterion of the real is found,
the type of opposition he describes is clearly conceived to be one of
spatial exteriority 2. Thus, one aspect of Heisenberg's philosophical
conversion is correctly described as the discovery of a new and
essentially empiricist (or phenomenalist) meaning for reality.
Influence of Plato
Heisenberg, however, was not happy in this condition; for both by
temperament and by training he inclined to speculative, abstract and
formal theories. Even in his early writings, one can find the implicit
distinction between two classes of "real objects": the ((empirically
real" and the "rationally real", which were not, however, distinguished
consciously and consciously compared 3. If empirical reality lacked the
properties of formal symmetry, invariance and necessity, then there
must be another kind of reality which was the bearer of these; for
Heisenberg was deeply imbued with the conviction that rationality
(or at least legality) was a universal law, and for him its absence was an
unendurable intellectual scandal. In this respect, he was the antithesis of
Bohr who, after "muddling through" brilliantly, was ready to conclude
that reality is, after all, a "muddle".
If Bohr represented the influence of Protagoras, Heisenberg came
early under the spell of Plato. He tells that when he was eighteen years
old the abortive communist revolution of 1919 took place in Bavaria.
He was temporarily drafted into the army and sent to guard the
Theological Seminary in Munich 4. There he talked philosophy with
the students and spent the early morning hours after sunrise on the
roof of the seminary reading the Timaeus of Plato 5. He was much
impressed by the notion that behind this illusory world of sense, there
Heisenberg, PhilosoPhic Problems etc., p. 56.
Heisenberg, Physical Principles etc., pp. 58, 64. Also ct. supra, pp. 86f.
3 Cf. Heisenberg, PhilosoPhic Problems etc., pp. 20-26, 106-107.
4 Heisenberg, Physicist's Conception 01 Nature, pp. 53-58.
5 Ibid., pp. 53-58; PhilosoPhic Problems etc., 35, 98; also ct. "Planck's Discovery and the
Problems of Modern Physics" by W. Heisenberg in On Modern Physics (London: Orion
Press, I96I), p. I9.
1

2
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was a real world of elementary particles which were pure mathe
matical forms.
The influence of Plato was to lead him to a conviction which he
retained throughout even his empiricist days that there were two kinds
of realities: intelligible realities which were the objects of episteme or
intellectual intuition, and sensible objects which were objects of
sensible intuition. He believed that we lacked the former kind of
knowledge. The combination of abstractive understanding and
empirical intuition to which we were reduced in consequence obtained
for us merely token or symbolic knowledge of physical reality but not
true knowledge. The type of symbolic knowledge characteristic of
physical science he called dianoia. These early views led him naturally
in the direction of Kant 1.

SECTION II: HEISENBERG AND KANT
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The Crisis 01 Kantian Critique
The second great influence on Heisenberg's thought was Kant, and
it was within the Kantian problematic that Heisenberg eventually
came to find his spiritual home. We have noted how his lively interest
in Plato prepared his mind. Kant's transcendental method of phi
losophy, moreover, makes an unfailing appeal to a theoretical physi
cist, for its starting point, viz., the acceptance of universal and
necessary scientific laws is one towards which he is sympathetically
disposed. Because of this peculiar dependence of Kantian philosophy
on classical physics, the first serious impact of modern physics on the
world of philosophy was its effect on the transcendental critique.
Relativity overthrew the absoluteness of Euclidean geometry and
quantum mechanics showed that causality in science (in the sense of
antecedent-consequent legality between phenomena) was not uni
versal or necessary 2. If the Kantian starting point is mistaken, if
science presupposes no universal or necessary principles then there
is no problematic, and the philosophy built upon it - however sublime 
is no more than a piece of groundless fancy. This collapse of the most
1 Heisenberg, Philosophic P,oblems etc., pp. 32-34. The distinction between the two
classes of objects and their relation to Kant was already expressed in a lecture given in
1934. He adds: "There has not yet been a discussion based upon the new outlook that is
sufficiently thorough to show how far this idea [of the a P,i01'i] is still fruitful in the wider
philosophical fields which were essential for Kant", PhilOSOPhic P,oblems etc., p. 21.
2 Ibid., p. 20; E,kenntnis, II (1931), pp. 182-183; On Modem Physics, p. 12.
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prestigious of classical metaphysical schemes was certainly one of the
major contributing causes of the practical hegemony of positivism in
scientific circles during the years following the discovery of relativity
and quantum mechanics.
The most disturbing failure of Kantian epistemology in modern
physics was the failure of causality in quantum mechanics: for without
causality there is no stable phenomenal object of experience. Another
category, substance, consequently fails on the quantum level I. For
causality can be applied only where there is continuity and coherence
in the field of experience, where phenomena are grouped into localised
wholes which preserve their self-identity in time and move along
continuous trajectories in three-dimensional Euclidean space. Cau
sality is then a necessary condition for the application of the category
of substance in human experience. "Nature, through the medium of
modern physics", wrote Heisenberg, "has reminded us very clearly
that we should never hope for such a firm basis [as Cartesian
rationalism] for the comprehension of the whole field of 'things per
ceptible'" 2. The failure of causality in quantum mechanics meant the
breakdown of the attempt to view nature as a systematic totality of
related bodies: nature must henceforth be described in terms of
individual observation events, i.e., instantaneously localised oc
currences - atomic reality-elements, as it were - for which we fashion
artificial links through which they are connected "in an abstract
space" 3.
Substance, in Kantian epistemology, or the permanent filling of the
category of reality, symbolised the presence of noumenal reality, which
itself remained, however, shrouded in mystery. The failure of the
category of substance in quantum mechanics broke the link be
tween the quantum mechanical object and noumenal reality. If a
quantum mechanical system is not a stable phenomenal object, i.e.,
not a "substance", then neither in the Kantian view does it symbolise
a noumenal reality.
These thoughts were scarcely more than implicit in Heisenberg'S
mind for a long time after the discovery of quantum mechanics. During
this period he was dominated uneasily by an idealistic (or positivistic)
empiricism more in the tradition of Berkeley and Mach than in that
of Hume or Locke.
1 Erkenntnis, loco cit., pp. I72-I82; Physical Principles etc., pp. 2, 63. Cf. I. Kant, Critique
of Pure Reason, trans. by N. Kemp Smith, p. 2I2 for "substance" and p. 218 for "causality".
2 PhilosoPhic Problems etc., p. 25.
3 Ibid., p. 93.

